A Poms view of a drawn game

Fifteen Against Thirteen: What England, Argentina and Australia Can Teach the Rest of Rugby

Australia’s inability to find a winner against 13-man Argentina in Mendoza looked extraordinary. Yet Argentina had been on the other side of the same equation against England only weeks earlier. Together, the two matches offer an intriguing lesson about numerical advantage in modern rugby.

There were around ten minutes remaining in Mendoza when Australia were presented with what appeared to be a wonderful opportunity to win the Test match.

Argentina had just lost Lucio Cinti and Santiago Carreras to yellow cards, the second offence resulting in a penalty try which brought Australia level at 28-28. The Wallabies now had 15 players against 13 and enough time, seemingly, to exploit the additional space. They couldn’t do it.

Argentina survived, the match finished level and Australia still left with the considerable achievement of a first multi-Test series victory on Argentine soil. Yet those closing minutes created one of the more interesting tactical questions of the weekend. Why, in an era when attacking systems are designed to identify and exploit the smallest defensive mismatch, can two extra players sometimes prove surprisingly difficult to use?

It is a question that becomes even more interesting when we look back only a few weeks to England’s Nations Championship encounter with Argentina in Santiago del Estero.

On that occasion, Argentina were the team trying to exploit a numerical advantage. England received four yellow cards during an extraordinary contest, were reduced to 13 players on two separate occasions and briefly found themselves defending with only 12.

England still won 31-24.

Taken together, the two matches provide useful examples of what playing with, and against, 13 men actually involves. They also offer lessons that stretch well beyond international rugby.

Mendoza and an opportunity lost

Australia had actually started strongly in Mendoza and led 14-0 before Argentina worked their way back into the contest. The Pumas eventually moved 28-21 ahead when captain Pablo Matera scored his second try following an impressive 23-phase attack.

Then the complexion of the game changed dramatically. Cinti was yellow-carded for a deliberate knock-on before Carreras followed him to the sin-bin after another deliberate intervention as Australia attacked close to the Argentine line. The second incident produced a penalty try, making it 28-28 and leaving Argentina with 13 players.

The assumption was obvious: Australia now had the advantage and should win.

Modern defensive systems, however, make the equation rather more complicated than simply counting the number of players on each side. When two players disappear, two convenient holes do not automatically appear in the defensive line. The defending team adjusts. It can narrow its defensive shape, protect the most dangerous areas around the breakdown and accept that there are parts of the field where the opposition will have space.

The challenge for the attacking side is therefore not merely to identify where the extra men are. It has to manipulate the remaining defenders sufficiently to make those extra men useful.

That distinction became important in Mendoza.

Create the space rather than simply looking for it

The instinct when playing against 13 is often to move the ball wide as quickly as possible. There are fewer defenders, therefore there must be space somewhere towards the edge.

Yet going wide too early can actually assist the defence. A well-organised defensive line can drift, allow the touchline to become an additional defender and challenge the attacking side to execute several passes accurately under pressure. The alternative is to make the numerical disadvantage hurt before attempting to exploit it.

Repeated carries around the middle of the field force the remaining defenders to work. Quick ruck ball begins to draw players towards the breakdown and the defensive line becomes narrower. Once that has happened, the attacking team can move the ball towards the edge against a defence that has already been manipulated.

The objective is not simply to find space. It is to create it.

Australia struggled to achieve that consistently in the final minutes, although there was an important mitigating factor. Carter Gordon, who had entered the match at fly-half, suffered what has subsequently been confirmed as a broken leg and is expected to be sidelined for around two months.

His departure forced Ryan Lonergan to move from scrum-half to fly-half, with Kalani Thomas taking over at nine. Australia therefore had their numerical advantage at precisely the moment when their attacking organisation had been disrupted.

Playing 15 against 13 still requires somebody to control the attack, recognise how the opposition have reorganised and decide when the moment has arrived to move the ball.

Argentina had already seen the problem from the other side

What makes Mendoza particularly interesting is that Argentina had experienced almost the reverse situation against England during July’s Nations Championship. England’s discipline was dreadful at times in Santiago del Estero. Jack van Poortvliet and Alex Coles were both yellow-carded shortly after half-time, with Coles’ offence resulting in a penalty try. Later, Henry Pollock and Manny Iyogun were also sent to the sin-bin and England briefly found themselves defending with only 12 players following repeated infringements.

Argentina did punish England at various stages, but they never managed to turn their substantial numerical advantages into control of the match.

England won 31-24.

The circumstances were not identical to Mendoza, but the comparison is revealing. Within a matter of weeks Argentina had discovered both sides of one of rugby’s more unusual tactical situations. They had struggled to make extra players decisive against England and then demonstrated against Australia how difficult a 13-man defence can be to break down.

There is no evidence that the England experience directly shaped Argentina’s approach in Mendoza, but it certainly illustrates the same tactical problem.

Numerical superiority does not automatically create territorial or attacking superiority.

England showed that 13 men can still attack

Perhaps the most important lesson from the England game was that going down to 13 does not necessarily mean spending the entire period defending. England continued to look for attacking opportunities despite their disciplinary problems. When Van Poortvliet returned from the sin-bin, his long pass helped create Marcus Smith’s try, while Immanuel Feyi-Waboso also scored as England found ways of attacking despite continually changing personnel.

Argentina demonstrated something similar in Mendoza. They were not prepared simply to form a defensive line and wait for Australia to attack them repeatedly.

Matera’s late work at the breakdown was particularly important. Already responsible for two tries, the Argentine captain produced a crucial intervention as Australia attempted to build pressure.

That moment illustrates an important point about defending with reduced numbers. Sometimes the most effective way of defending with 13 players is to make sure the opposition don’t have the ball.

If a team with 13 can retain possession for a minute, ten per cent of a yellow-card period has disappeared without the opposition being able to use its numerical advantage. Win a penalty, kick into touch and retain possession again and another significant portion of the ten minutes can vanish.

The clock therefore becomes part of the defensive strategy.

A question for National League coaches

This is where the lessons from Argentina, Australia and England become particularly relevant to the wider game. Imagine the same situation in National One or National Two. The scores are level with ten minutes remaining and the opposition have two players in the sin-bin.

What does the coach want to see?

The temptation may be to move the ball immediately, but perhaps the more effective strategy is patience. Use the pack, generate several phases of quick possession and make 13 players defend repeatedly before attempting to exploit the width.

There is potentially an even greater advantage at National League level because fatigue can become more significant. Players are operating in a semi-professional environment and many will have completed a working week before taking the field on Saturday. Defensive structures are increasingly sophisticated, but they do not have the preparation time available to international teams.

Making 13 players complete repeated defensive sets should eventually require somebody to make two tackles rather than one. That is when the numerical advantage can become a physical advantage, and eventually an attacking one.

There is an equally interesting question for the coach whose team has been reduced to 13. Do you simply defend, or do you continue looking for opportunities to keep possession, contest breakdowns and force the opposition to play in areas where the defensive structure remains strongest?

England and Argentina both suggest that passive survival may not be the best answer.

Defending the clock

The psychological dimension should not be underestimated either.

When a team goes down to 13, expectations change immediately. The defending side is expected to concede while the attacking side is expected to score. Every successful defensive phase therefore has a different effect on the two teams.

For the side with 13, another completed tackle represents progress towards the return of the sin-binned players. For the team with 15, every unsuccessful attack increases the pressure to make the advantage count.

That can influence decision-making. Passes become forced, attacks are moved wide before the defence has been compressed and players begin trying to manufacture opportunities rather than allowing them to develop.

The defending side, meanwhile, can make the clock an ally. Keep possession, slow the attacking ball legally, contest the breakdown selectively and make the opposition restart as often as possible.

The lesson is not simply to defend the space. It is to defend the clock as well.

Two matches worth watching again

Australia will understandably look back at Mendoza and believe they should have won. They had the players, the opportunity and enough time to find another score. Gordon’s serious injury unquestionably complicated matters, but the closing stages will still provide valuable material for the coaching staff.

Argentina can also look back at their Nations Championship encounter with England and ask why their own numerical advantages did not produce a victory.

For coaches elsewhere in the game, however, the value of these matches is not in allocating blame. It is in examining what happens to the structure of a rugby match when the numbers suddenly become uneven. Playing 15 against 13 is not simply conventional rugby with two defenders removed. Both teams change their approach. The defence becomes narrower and more selective, possession becomes more valuable and the clock becomes part of the contest.

For the attacking team, the challenge is to resist the temptation to force the advantage. Carry, manipulate the defence and create the space before trying to use it.

For the team with 13, the lesson from England and Argentina is equally valuable. Continue competing, keep the ball whenever possible and recognise that ten minutes can disappear surprisingly quickly.

Those principles apply in Mendoza and Santiago del Estero, but they apply just as readily on a National League touchline on a Saturday afternoon.

The next time a team goes down to 13, perhaps the most interesting question is not whether the opposition will score.

It is how both sides choose to play the next ten minutes. So let me leave all rugby coaches this question

“You’re 15 v 13 for the last ten minutes: what are your first instructions?”

SeniorMash Reflections in collaboration with TalkingRugbyUnion and their resident Oz, Matthew Wood